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PUBLIC FUNDING OF POLITICAL PARTIES
Ignacio Ortuño-Ortín and Christian Schultz
A B S T R A C T
This paper concerns public funding of parties. Parties receive public funds
depending on their vote share. Funds …nance electoral campaigns. Two cases
are investigated. In the …rst some voters are policy motivated and some are
“impressionable” - their vote depends directly on campaign expenditures. In
the second campaigning is informative and all voters are policy motivated.
Public funds increase policy convergence in both cases. The e¤ect is
larger, the more funding depends on vote shares. When campaigns are infor-
mative, there may be multiple equilibria. Intuitively, a large party can stay
large since it receives large funds.
Keywords: Public Funding, Political Competition, Information.
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1 Introduction
The funding of political parties is a fundamental aspect of democracy, but
although most countries have some sort of public-funding policy for parties,
the way it is provided varies considerably from country to country. In the
U.S., for instance, public funding takes the form of \matching funds”, with
certain limitations being imposed on contributions and expenditures. In
many other countries, however, parties receive government funding in relation
to the share of the electorial vote they achieved in the last election. Le Duc
et al.(1996), investigate 27 democracies and report that in 17 cases, public
subsidy depends on vote (or seat) share. In Denmark, for example, one vote
is equivalent to approximately 20 Danish kroner per year (approximately
$3 US.). See Bille (1997).1 At …rst glance, such a system would certainly
seem to favour the larger parties. Mair (1994) reports that in many European
countries public …nance is at least as important for political parties as private
…nance is and adds that in some cases it may be even more important.
In this paper, we provide a simple theoretical model that casts some
light on the issue of public funding of political parties. While the debate
about public funding has often focused on fairness and on reducing the power
of wealthy private lobbies, we show that an important consequence of the
system, which prevails in many European countries, is policy convergence.
There is substantial empirical evidence to support the hypothesis that elec-
tion campaigns directly a¤ect how the electorate votes, (see e.g. Holbrook
1In Denmark, direct public support of political parties was enacted in 1986. In 1995 the
level was four-doubled. Billie (p201) concludes that in comparison to 1985, the proportion
of the parties’ revenues that is provided by state funding has increased dramatically. He
investigates all of the major Danish parties and …nds that state funding accounts for
between 48% and 98% of a party’s income
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1996), which, of course, is precisely why such campaigns are carried out.2
What one could discuss, however, is just why this is so. Baron (1994) (and
McKelvey and Ordeshook (1987)) suggest that there are two types of vot-
ers: “informed” and “uninformed” or “impressionable” voters. The informed
electorate votes according to the policies proposed by the di¤erent political
parties (or candidates). Impressionable voters are, however, poorly informed
about the policies of the di¤erent parties and their vote is directly in‡uenced
by campaign spending3. Alternatively, one may assume that all voters are pol-
icy motivated but not necessarily well informed about the parties’ policies.
Campbell et al. (1960) provide evidence that most voters cannot correctly
identify the position of parties or candidates on the main political issues,
while Popkin et al. (1976) try to explain why voters have such a poor level of
information, by arguing that the gathering of information is a costly invest-
ment. In such a case, campaign spending could spread information about
a party’s policies, and as such, political campaigns are rather like informa-
tive advertising campaigns, as studied by Butters (1977) or Grossman and
Shapiro (1984) among others. Political campaigns then a¤ect the outcome of
an election since voters will cast their vote depending on their information.4
Since both of these views seem reasonable, we shall investigate them both
within the framework of the same basic model, with two policy motivated
parties and a uni-dimensional policy space. When some voters are impres-
sionable, a party directly receives a larger vote-share if it spends more on its
campaigns. We show that public funding that depends on vote-share makes
2See also Lazarsfeld et al. (1944), Campbell et al. (1960) and Finkel (1993).
3This type of campaign is similar to the persuasive adversitising analyzed in the eco-
nomics literature, see for example Shy (1995).
4See Morton and Cameron (1992) and Austen-Smith (1997) for a critique to the infor-
mative role of the campaign advertising.
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the parties’ policies converge. The reason for this is intuitive. The likelihood
that a party’s policy is implemented is assumed to depend positively on its
share of the total vote. For a politically motivated party this creates a trade-
o¤, a more moderate policy is less good but more likely to be implemented.
This trade o¤ is changed when public funds depend vote shares. In this case
the vote gaining e¤ect of policy moderation is enhanced (as the public funds
gained buys even more votes) and in equilibrium, therefore, policies are more
moderate. The more responsive votes are to money, and the more responsive
public funding is to votes, the more the parties’ policies converge.
In countries where public funds depend on the vote shares, they are dis-
tributed after the election where the vote shares are known. If the funds
that are earned in one election are used to …nance the following campaign,
therefore, a dynamic process arises. If, however, a party is able to borrow
funds on a credit market, it may spend the money before the election and
repay the debt using the public funds after the election. In order to keep our
model simple and avoid complicated dynamics, we shall assume that this is
the case. In the model public funding depends on the expected vote shares.
We study a rational expectations solution, where expectations are correct.
For the sake of simplicity, we assume that parties and voters are risk-
neutral. This, however, is not essential for our qualitative results. If agents
are risk-averse, the European system for public funding of parties is welfare-
enhancing, since it reduces policy polarization and, therefore, the general risk
for everyone. One could argue, therefore, that such a system is most called
for in countries where other political institutions do not make for policy
convergence.
We brie‡y consider the case where parties have some private (lump sum)
funding. This mitigates the e¤ects of public funding. Since they become
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relatively less important, parties are less eager to moderate their policies to
obtain such funds. We also brie‡y study an extension to a case with more
parties. With a uni-modal distribution of the voters’ preferred policies, the
results previously obtained are easily transferable to the examples we have
studied. Public funding increases the incentive to moderate policies for all
parties, so that, in equilibrium, the policies will be compressed more around
the middle.
In the second case, with informative campaigns, all voters are policy
motivated but only some are informed about a party’s policy. An uninformed
voter, however, has an expectation regarding the policy. For the usual reasons
- our results should not hinge on arbitrary assumptions about expectations
- we study a rational expectations solution. Campaign spending in‡uences
the voters’ information in di¤erent ways. Voters may see television spots and
newspaper advertisements. However, the e¤ect may also be more indirect. A
party can get more exposure in the mass media by spending more money on
staging events, or having a campaign sta¤ that caters to the journalists and
provides regular press releases, etc. Whatever the reason may be, however,
we assume that the more a party spends on its campaign, the more voters
learn its policy.
Since only informed voters learn about a policy change, the gain in vote-
share the party makes from having moderated its policy is larger, the larger
is the fraction of informed voters. The more e¤ective funds are in spreading
information and the greater the funds available for campaigns are, the more
policies will therefore converge. In this setting, however, it is not important
whether funds depend on vote-share or not. Our model also shows that a
party who has access to more e¢cient campaign technology will receive a
larger share of the vote. Thus, it also highlights the importance for parties
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to have good relations with the mass media.
Furthermore, multiple equilibria might well exist. In some cases, there are
at least three equilibria: one which is symmetric and two asymmetric ones. In
an asymmetric equilibrium, a large party receives large funds, which implies
that many voters are informed about its policy and that its gain in votes
from moderating its policy will also be large, so the incentive to do so is
also greater. The smaller party, on the other hand, …nds itself trapped in a
situation in which it has few votes and a minimum of public funding. Hence,
very few voters are informed about its policy and few people will notice if
it is altered, so that the gain in votes from doing so will also be minimal.
In equilibrium, therefore, such a party proposes a rather extreme policy and
receives very few votes.
We have not found many theoretical papers on public funding of politi-
cal parties. Baron (1994) considers lobbying in a model with informed and
uninformed voters, in which parties seek to maximize their probability of
winning. If all of the voters are informed, each party chooses the median
voter’s most preferred policy. As a result of the uninformed voter’s behavior
however, parties also have an incentive to raise funds. Courting lobby groups,
who are generally considered to be extreme, can do this. In their desire to
please the lobbies, therefore, political parties tend to propose more extreme
policies. The introduction of public funding (as a lump-sum and independent
of vote-share), mitigates the power of interest groups and their contributions
become relatively less important. As a result, the parties’ policies are less
polarized.
Our argument here is di¤erent. It does not depend on the mitigating of
the lobby groups’ power. We consider partisan parties which, by themselves,
would choose polarized policies even in the absence of lobbies. When public
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funding depends on vote-share, parties get an extra incentive to moderate
their policies. When public funding does not depend on the vote share, (as in
the U.S. system which Baron analyses), there is no policy convergence in our
model with impressionable voters. Hence, our analysis shows that the precise
sort of public funding system employed is signi…cant to the e¤ects on policy
convergence. Furthermore, we extend the analysis to informative advertising
campaigns and analyse the e¤ects of public funding in this framework. The
amount of funds made available to the parties and the information technology
they employ play a major role, but again, the results are not related to
mitigating the power of lobby groups.
Mueller and Stratman (1994) consider both informative and persuasive
campaigns where money directly moves votes. They have, however, no formal
model for informative campaigning and focus on private contributions to
political parties.
The organization of the paper is as follows: Section 2 presents the basic
model with impressionable voters and uninformative campaigning. Section
3 derives the equilibrium created by public funding. Section 4 considers,
brie‡y, the case in which there are more parties; Section 5 analyses the case
of both public and private funding. Informative campaigning is the subject
of the rest of the paper: Section 6 presents the basic model and discusses
equilibria. Section 7 introduces public funding and contains examples of
di¤erent information technologies that lead to di¤erent kinds of equilibria,
and Section 8 concludes. A few proofs are relegated to an Appendix.
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2 The Model With Impressionable Voters
There are two parties, L and R; and a continuum of voters of measure one.
Politics is uni-dimensional. The parties each propose a policy, l and r re-
spectively, receive campaign money, cL and cR; which is spent, and then an
election is held. The implemented policy will be either l or r. There are
two kinds of voters, informed and impressionable. The fraction of informed
voters is (1¡ ®); where 0 < ® < 1:
If the policy is ¼; an informed voter with bliss point x gets utility
u(¼; x) = ¡ j¼ ¡ xj : (1)
The bliss points are distributed on the interval [0,1] according to the cdf
F (x); the corresponding (strictly positive, di¤erentiable) density is f(x): Let
m be the median bliss point, F (m) = 1=2: The parties are committed to
their policy proposals, l and r: As l · r5 an informed voter with bliss point
x prefers party L0s policy if x · l+r
2
: Since voting is sincere, F
³
l+r
2
´
of the
informed voters vote for party L. Parties are policy motivated and have the
same type of utility function as voters (see Wittman 1990). The bliss point
of party L is xL;the bliss point of party R is xR; and xL < xR:
The di¤erence in campaign spending by the parties is ¢ ´ cL ¡ cR: A
fraction H(¢) of the impressionable voters votes for party L:We will assume
that H 0 > 0; H(0) = 1
2
and H 00(¢) · 0 for all ¢ ¸ 0: The party spending
most is most popular. We further assume that the H function is symmetric:
H(¢) = 1¡H(¡¢); so H 00(¢) ¸ 0 for all ¢ · 0 and H 00(0) = 0. 6
5In principle, the parties can of course propose policies l; r where r < l: This will never
occur in equilibruim, however, so we will just disregard this case.
6The way electoral campaigning works here is similar to the “predatory adverstis-
ing” analyzed in oligopoly theory, see Friedman (1983). It is the formulation chosen by
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Party L0s total vote share is therefore
v = ®H(¢) + (1¡ ®)F
Ã
l + r
2
!
: (2)
As Grossman and Helpman (1996) do, we assume that the chance of a
party’s policy being implemented is increasing in its vote share. This is
slightly ad hoc, although it may not be unreasonable at all, and may be
rationalized in several ways. It may be due to the fact that the larger a
party is, the larger the in‡uence it has in parliament. One might also assume
that parties are uncertain about the outcome of the election, either because
of polling errors or uncertainty about who will vote and who will abstain.
The larger the (ex-ante) vote share a party has, the larger its probability of
winning the election and implementing its policy, (see Roemer 1994 for micro-
foundations). Alternatively, one can assume, as in Alesina and Rosenthal
(1995, 1996), Ortuno-Ortin (1997) and Gerber and Ortuno-Ortin (1998), that
the policy …nally implemented is a convex combination of the two policies
originally proposed, and that the weights are given by their di¤erent shares
of the electorial vote. Since our agents are risk-neutral, such an approach is
equivalent to the one we employ here. For whatever the reason might be,
we assume that party L0s policy is implemented with a probability of p (v) ;
where, for the sake of simplicity, p (v) = v: The linearity simpli…es formulas
but has no qualitative importance. Intuitively, the steeper the p function
at 1=2 is, the greater the incentive that the parties have to moderate their
policies7.
Parties receive public funds for campaigning. Such funds typically depend
Helpman and Grossmann (1996). Baron (1994) assumes that H depends on cL=cR: In our
setting,this would complicate a few formulas, but the qualitative results would not change.
7We see that our linear formulation of the p function makes for less policy convergence
than if we assumed that p was very steep at 1/2. On the other hand the linear formulation
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on the actual vote-share received in an election. If a party wants to spend
money before an election, therefore, it must either take a loan or spend the
money it received in the last election. Furthermore, if the party gets a loan,
the issue of credit-worthiness arises. On the other hand, if the funds it earned
in the last election are used, the problem becomes dynamic. Although these
aspects may be important in real life, we shall disregard credit-worthiness
and dynamic issues here, and study a rational expectations solution instead.
The timing is as follows: First, the di¤erent parties propose certain policies.
They then receive public funding that depends on their expected vote-share.
In equilibrium, the expectation is correct. This is equivalent to the case in
which parties borrow on a perfect credit market with rational expectations
before an election, and use the public funding they later receive for their
actual vote-share to repay the loans afterwards. Notice that if parties have
access to a perfect credit market, public funding will not prevent the entry
of new parties to the political arena. For the time being, however, we shall
disregard the issue of entry.
We normalize the size of the public funds available to parties to one.
We shall assume that public funding treats all parties equally. If party L is
expected to receive a share ve of votes, it therefore receives cL = Ã(ve) from
public funding, and party R then receives cR = Ã (1¡ ve). Accordingly,
Ã(1
2
) = 1
2
: We assume that the funding system ful…lls Ã0 ¸ 0 for all ve and
Ã00(ve) · 0 for all ve ¸ 1
2
; and Ã00(ve) ¸ 0 for all ve · 1
2
: A party that has
already obtained more than 50% of the electorial vote (weakly) increases its
funds by receiving more votes, but at a non-increasing rate. The di¤erence
of the parties’ utility functions makes for more convergence than if parties utility functions
were strictly concave. In the latter case the marginal disutility of moderating the policy
would be increasing.
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in funds received, therefore, is ¢(ve) ´ Ã(ve) ¡ (1 ¡ Ã(ve)) = 2Ã(ve) ¡ 1;
¢0(ve) ¸ 0 for all ve; and ¢00(ve) · 0 for all ve ¸ 1
2
and ¢00(ve) ¸ 0 for all
ve · 1
2
:
In the Danish system described in the introduction, in which a party
receives approximately 20 Danish kroner. (US$ 3) per year per vote, Ã0 > 0
and Ã00 = 0:
Given an expected vote share of ve; and policies l; r; the actual vote-share
of party L is
v = ®H(¢(ve)) + (1¡ ®)F
Ã
l + r
2
!
: (3)
Under rational expectations, ve = v; hence v solves equation (3) with v
inserted for ve: If
®H 0(¢(v))¢0(v) < 1; for all v 2 [0; 1] (4)
the solution is unique. We shall assume this is the case, and denote the
solution by v(l; r): This means that the responsiveness of public funding and
of the impressionable voters are su¢ciently limited to make the problem well-
behaved. Note that we are not assuming that the …nal equilibrium is unique,
but just that there is a unique vote-share for each party for a given pair of
policies. The implicit function theorem yields:
@v(l; r)
@l
=
1¡®
2
f
³
l+r
2
´
1¡ ® H 0(¢(v)) ¢0(v) > 0 (5)
When party L changes its policy, some informed voters change their votes.
This, in turn, changes the size of the public funds allocated to the party
and, therefore, the share of impressionable votes it gains as well. But this,
once again, changes the size of the funds received, etc., etc. All of these
repercussions are taken into account in the rational expectations solution.
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The assumption ®¢0(v)H0(¢(v)) < 1 ensures that the comparative statics
make sense, i.e., if party L increases its policy (towards the middle), it will
also increase its vote-share.
3 Political Equilibrium
The parties are policy motivated and seek to maximize expected utility. They
take the other party’s policy as given and recognize how the choice of policy
might in‡uence the distribution of funds and the relative campaign spending.
Given the pair of policies (l; r) , party’s L expected utility is
v(l; r) (¡ jl ¡ xLj) + ( 1¡ v(l; r)) (¡ jr ¡ xLj) ; (6)
Similarly, party’s R expected utility is given by
v(l; r) (¡ jl ¡ xRj) + ( 1¡ v(l; r)) (¡ jr ¡ xRj) : (7)
A Political Equilibrium with uninformative campaigning is a pair of poli-
cies (l¤; r¤); such that l¤ maximizes (6) given r¤ and r¤ maximizes (7) given
l¤:
In principle, a party’s optimal policy may be equal to the party’s bliss
point where the utility function is non-di¤erentiable. We shall, however, only
consider cases where solutions are interior, i.e., where xL < l < r < xR: We
have
Proposition 1 In an interior equilibrium, each party has a winning prob-
ability of 1/2. The expected policy is equal to the median informed voter’s
preferred policy
l¤ + r¤
2
= m (8)
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The policies are symmetric around m and the policy polarization is given by
r¤ ¡ l¤ = 1¡ ®H
0(0) ¢0(1
2
)
1¡ ®
1
f(m)
(9)
Proof: see the Appendix.
The policies are symmetric around the median informed voter’s bliss
point. The di¤erence in the policies depends on the density of voters at
the median, f(m): If the density is high, the policies are close, as many votes
can be gained by moving the policy towards the middle. If the density is
small, parties choose policies that are closer to their own preferred policy.
The numerator in (9) re‡ects the fraction of impressionable voters, ®;
how responsive the impressionable voters are, H0(0); and how responsive the
public funding system is, ¢0(1
2
): The larger the responsiveness, the closer the
policies.
No public funding corresponds to the special case of the model where
¢0(0) = 0; then
r¤ ¡ l¤ = 1
1¡ ®
1
f(m)
Comparing with (9) we see that public funding makes the parties’ policies
converge. The intuition is simple. Public funding gives an extra incentive to
moderate policies, since the extra votes they gain makes more public funds
available, which, in turn can be used to gain further votes.
We can also compare this with the case of no impressionable voters, ® = 0:
In this case the di¤erence in policies would be
r¤ ¡ l¤ = 1
f(m)
>From (9) it directly follows that if H 0(0) ¢0(1
2
) > 1; then polices are
more convergent than in the bench-mark case with no impressionable voters,
and if H 0(0) ¢0(1
2
) < 1; policies are more divergent. In the knife-edge case,
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where H 0(0) ¢0(1
2
) = 1; the vote-share of a party responds in the same way
to changes in policy whether there are impressionable voters or not. The
impressionable voters distribute their votes just as the informed ones do
and the policies are the same as when there are no impressionable voters:
Hence, in such a case, the publicly funded electoral system works as if there
were only informed voters. Public funding, therefore, o¤sets the presence of
poorly informed voters.
In the Appendix, we show that the second order condition for maximum
is ful…lled if
f 0
f
< 4; and
d2¢
dl2
,
d¢
dl
+
H 00
H 0
< 2: (10)
The latter part is a joint condition on ¢ and H; and it is di¢cult to provide
general conditions that ensure that the inequalities in (10) are ful…lled. We
show in the Appendix , however, that if H 00 = 0 and Ã00 = 0; so ¢00 = 0;
it is then ful…lled. As is clear from the derivation, it is not necessary that
H 00 = 0 and ¢00 = 0, but rather that they should simply not be numerically
too large.
We have assumed that the equilibrium is interior, xL < l < r < xR: This
obviously implies that r¡ l < xR¡xL: As can be seen from equation (9) this
requires f(m) to be su¢ciently large and/or
³
1¡ ®H 0(0) ¢0(1
2
)
´
/(1¡ ®)
to be su¢ciently small. An example that ful…lls this condition is, xL = 0;
xR = 1; m = 1=2; H
0(0) ¢0(1
2
) = 1 and f(m) > 1: From the derivations in
the appendix, it is clear that an interior equilibrium then exists, provided
that the second-order condition is ful…lled, which is the case if, for instance,
H 00 = ¢00 = 0 and f 0=f < 4:
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4 More than Two Parties
In this section we sketch the case with N parties. Party n0s policy is xn and
its bliss point is bn; and b1 < b2 < ::: < bN : If the parties propose policies
x1 < x2 < ::: < xN ; the fraction of the informed electorate who vote for party
n is
F
µ
xn+1 + xn
2
¶
¡ F
µ
xn + xn¡1
2
¶
:
Let ven be the expected vote-share for party n: The public funds allocated
to party n depends only on ven; and not on the vote-shares of the other
parties. This means, in e¤ect, that Ã(ven) is proportional to the vote-share,
which is the case in most real-life public-funding systems. Similarly, a party’s
impressionable votes depend only on its own campaign spending and not on
what the other parties spend. This implies that the fraction of impressionable
votes that a party wins is directly proportional the fraction of public funds
it receives. The total number of votes for party n is therefore:
vn = ®ven + (1¡ ®)
·
F
µ
xn+1 + xn
2
¶
¡ F
µ
xn + xn¡1
2
¶¸
Applying rational expectations ven = vn; we get
vn = F
µ
xn+1 + xn
2
¶
¡ F
µ
xn + xn¡1
2
¶
:
With proportionality in the Ã and H functions, the public funding system
makes the model work as if there were only policy-motivated voters. Without
such public funding, party n0s vote-share would be
~vn = ®
1
n
+ (1¡ ®)
·
F
µ
xn+1 + xn
2
¶
¡ F
µ
xn + xn¡1
2
¶¸
As ® > 0; public funding enhances the e¤ects of changes in policy on vote-
shares, just as in the case of two parties.
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Party n0s problem is maxxn ¡
PN
i=1 v
i jxi ¡ bnj : Clearly, xn < xn¡1 or
xn > xn+1 is not optimal. Assuming xn > bn; the …rst-order condition is
¡@v
n¡1
@xn
jxn¡1 ¡ bnj ¡ @v
n
@xn
jxn ¡ bnj ¡ vn ¡ @v
n+1
@xn
jxn+1 ¡ bnj = 0
(if xn < bn; vn enters with a plus). Using @v
n¡1
@xn
+ @v
n
@xn
+ @v
n+1
@xn
= 0; we get
¡vn ¡ @v
n¡1
@xn
(jxn¡1 ¡ bnj ¡ jxn ¡ bnj)¡ @v
n+1
@xn
(jxn+1 ¡ bnj ¡ jxn ¡ bnj) = 0
(11)
An increase in xn has three e¤ects, each of which correspond one of the three
terms. First, when xn > bn; it lowers the utility from the party’s own policy,
which is implemented with a probability of vn: Secondly, the probability
that n¡1; rather than n; wins increases, which gives an expected utility loss
for party n: Thirdly, the probability that party n; rather than n + 1; wins
increases, which gives an expected utility gain for party n:
In general, therefore, whether public-funding promotes policy convergence
or not depends on the distribution of voters .However, look at the extreme
parties. They only face competition from one side. The problem they face
is just as if there only were two parties: i.e., moving towards the middle
increases the chances of their policies being implemented, but their policies
become less attractive. As we have already seen, public funding increases the
vote-gaining e¤ect and, ceteris paribus, this makes the parties move closer to
the middle. Let us suppose that the distribution of the voters’ bliss points is
uni-modal with the peak in the middle. A party facing competition on both
sides will have a net gain in votes by moving closer to middle, as the density of
voters there is higher. The introduction of public funds only reinforces this
e¤ect. Furthermore, since government funding makes the extreme parties
move closer to the middle, the neighboring party …nds that the policy of the
extreme party is not as bad as it seemed to be before. The neighbor-party,
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therefore, has an increased incentive to moderate its own policy, just slightly
more than it did before. This has repercussions on the following neighbor,
etc., etc. There is therefore the strong intuition that if the distribution of
voters is uni-modal with its peak in the middle, public funding will induce
parties to have more moderate policies.
Analytical solutions are hard to obtain (as the problem is one of n non-
linear equations in n unknowns), but we have investigated a large number of
examples with Mathematica that all yield the result described above, when-
ever the distribution is uni-modal.8. Public funding compresses the policies
around the peak of the distribution. We present just one example here,
with 4 parties, in which both the parties and the voters have quadratic
preferences (to avoid non-di¤erentiabilities). Party i0s utility function is
u(x; bi) = ¡(x ¡ bi)2: We let, b1 = 0; b2 = 1=3; b3 = 2=3 and b4 = 1;
and ® = 1=4. The voters’ bliss points are distributed according to a beta
distribution with both parameters equal to two. Figure 1 illustrates the re-
sults. The triangles represent their policies when there is no public funding,
and the pentagons when there is. The Figure clearly reveals the expected
result: i.e., public funding induces policy convergence.9
5 When Parties also have Private Funds
Now let us suppose that the parties also have access to private funds. For
the sake of simplicity, we shall assume that such funds are independent of
the policies chosen by the parties. Political parties might have endowments
or receive contributions from di¤erent social groups whose overall political
8The Mathematica note-books are available from the authors on request.
9It can also be shown that the policy variance is lower under the public funding case.
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tendencies are more in line with the party’s. A typical example would be
that of trade unions who support social-democratic parties, regardless of
the precise policy they choose. There is comprehensive literature on pri-
vate lobbying, and its e¤ects on policy-making are well-understood, see e.g.
Baron (1994), Grossman and Helpman (1996), or the surveys in Persson and
Tabellini (1999) and Austen-Smith (1997). It is therefore not our intention
to make any further contribution to this topic. Our interest, here, is placed
exclusively on the interplay that exists between private and public funding
of political parties.
Let us now assume, that party L has cPL private funds and party R has
cPR; and let ¢P ´ cPL ¡ cPR:The di¤erence in funding between the two
parties then is ~¢(v) = Ã(v) ¡ (1 ¡ Ã(v)) + cPL ¡ cPR = ¢(v) + ¢P : The
vote-share of party L will be the …xed point of
v = ®H(¢(v) + ¢P ) + (1¡ ®)F
Ã
l + r
2
!
The …rst-order conditions for maximum are unchanged (exceptH 0 is taken
in ¢+¢P ): Hence, we still have, in equilibrium, that v = 1=2 and therefore
that ¢ = 0: Now let us suppose that party L has a smaller endowment than
party R; so that ¢P < 0: Then H(0 + ¢P ) < 1=2; and since we still have
v = 1=2; it must be the case that F
³
l+r
2
´
> 1=2, which means l+r
2
> m: The
average policy is more to the right, the reason being that the rich party R
can a¤ord to propose a more extreme policy, as it gets a larger share of the
impressionable voters.
In this analysis, the relative sizes of public and private funds do not mat-
ter. This may seem unreasonable. Suppose, instead, that the impressionable
votes depend on the relative campaign expenditure of the di¤erent parties.
Thus, H depends on cL
cL+cR
: Without private funding, the above analysis is
19
unchanged, just let ¢(v) = Ã(v)
Ã(v)+1¡Ã(v) = Ã(v): With private funds, the vote
share of party L is a …xed point of
v = ®H
Ã
cPL + Ã(v)
1 + cPL + cPR
!
+ (1¡ ®)F
Ã
l + r
2
!
and hence
@v
@l
=
1¡®
2
f
³
l+r
2
´
1¡ ®Ã0 1
1+cPL+cPR
H 0
³
cPL+Ã(v)
1+cPL+cPR
´
The vote-gaining e¤ect from public funding is smaller the larger private fund-
ing is. Once again, the richer party is able to propose a more extreme policy
and still get half of the votes. Furthermore, in such a setting, the expression
for policy polarization becomes
r ¡ l = 1¡ ®Ã
0(1
2
) 1
1+cPL+cPR
H 0
³
cPL+1=2
1+cPL+cPR
´
1¡ ®
1
f(m)
It is obvious that the larger private funds are, (relative to the size of public
funds, normalized to one), the more di¤erent the parties’ policies are. Pri-
vate funding mitigates the policy convergence induced by the public funding.
To summarize then, with both private and public funding, the model pre-
dicts that there should be more policy convergence in countries where public
funding are relatively large in comparison to private contributions.
As discussed in the introduction, Baron (1994) considers a model with
private and public funding in which parties seek to maximize plurality. With
no funding whatever, the parties choose policies that are equal to the median
voter’s preferred policy. In Baron´s model, private funding is provided by
extreme lobby groups, and the parties therefore propose more extreme poli-
cies in order to please the lobby groups. Public funds are given in a lump
sum, (as in the US system), and they mitigate the power of lobby groups,
since the relative importance of private funds is reduced, and policies be-
come more convergent. As we have seen, in our model exact opposite result
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is obtained from giving parties lump-sum contributions. Such contributions,
(whether private or public), decrease the relative importance of the funds
earned through votes, which in turn, mitigates the incentive to modify poli-
cies. If we introduced extreme lobby groups, however, this would obviously
give parties an added incentive to propose more extreme policies. The bot-
tom line is clear: i.e., the exact way in which public and private funding is
provided is crucial to the result.
6 Informative Campaigning
In this section, we assume that all voters are policy oriented and have the
same preferences as those described above. However, voters are not auto-
matically aware of the parties’ policies, and must be informed through their
campaigns.
If a party spends an amount c on its campaign, a fraction Á(c) of the
voters learns about its policy. Parties cannot target their campaigns, so that
the probability that a particular voter becomes informed is independent of
her bliss point. One can imagine that a party advertises exclusively on tele-
vision10 or in magazines, and that only those voters who happen to see its
advertising will learn about its current policy. Some voters, however, might
well become informed regardless of whether they see advertisement or not.
They might read newspapers, listen to radio stations or the news on televi-
sion. The important feature here is that a more intensive campaign makes a
larger proportion of voters informed about the party’s policy11, Á0(c) > 0:
10Television advertisements represent the most important expenditure in the electoral
campaigns in many countries, see West (1993).
11See Holbrook (1996) for evidence of the information generated in the electoral cam-
paigns and Alvarez (1996), Brians and Wattenberg (1996) and Just et al. (1990) for
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On the other hand, even a voter who is uninformed about a party’s policy
has an expectation about it. For the usual reasons, we shall assume rational
expectations. The timing is as follows: First, uninformed voters form expec-
tations, then parties choose policies, which are seen only by informed voters,
and then the election is held. Let the uninformed voters’ beliefs about parties
L and R’s polices be denoted by le and re:
We assume that both parties run electoral campaigns. For the time being
we shall not concern ourselves with just how the campaign funds are raised.
Let ÁL be the fraction of voters who learn about party L’s policy and let ÁR
be the fraction who learn about party R’s. Given policies l; r, and fractions
ÁL; ÁR; the vote-share for party L is
V (l; r; le; re; ÁL; ÁR) = ÁLÁRF
Ã
l + r
2
!
+ ÁL (1¡ ÁR)F
Ã
l + re
2
!
+(12)
(1¡ ÁL)ÁRF
Ã
le + r
2
!
+ (1¡ ÁL) (1¡ ÁR)F
Ã
le + re
2
!
A fraction of the electorate, ÁLÁR, learn about both l and r, of whom a
proportion F
³
l+r
2
´
prefers l: A fraction ÁL(1¡ ÁR) only learns about l; and
they vote relying on their prior re; : of these a proportion, F
³
l+re
2
´
, prefers
l, and so forth. We get
@V
@l
= ÁLÁR
1
2
f
Ã
l + r
2
!
+ ÁL (1¡ ÁR)
1
2
f
Ã
l + re
2
!
Using rational expectations re = r this reduces it to
@V
@l
=
ÁL
2
f
Ã
l + r
2
!
(13)
We see that @V
@l
depends on ÁL: This is the crucial aspect of the analysis: only
informed voters will respond to a policy change. The larger is the fraction of
evidence that television advertising increases voter information.
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informed voters, the more responsive the vote-share of a party is to changes
in policy. We also have
@V
@ÁL
= ÁR
Ã
F
Ã
l + r
2
!
¡ F
Ã
le + r
2
!!
+(1¡ ÁR)
Ã
F
Ã
l + re
2
!
¡ F
Ã
le + re
2
!!
= 0:
(14)
since, under rational expectations, le = l and re = r. Similarly, @V
@ÁR
= 0:
We also have that, under rational expectations,
V (l; r; l; r; ÁL; ÁR) = F
Ã
l + r
2
!
(15)
Party L’s problem is
max
l
V (l; r; le; re; ÁL; ÁR) (¡ jl ¡ xLj)+(1¡ V (l; r; le; re; ÁL; ÁR)) (¡ jr ¡ xLj) :
(16)
When we focus on interior equilibria, party L’s …rst-order condition isÃ
@V
@l
+
@V
@ÁL
@ÁL
@l
+
@V
@ÁR
@ÁR
@l
!
(r¤ ¡ l¤)¡ V = 0 (17)
Inserting (13), (14) and (15) gives
(r¤ ¡ l¤) =
F
³
l¤+r¤
2
´
ÁL
2
f
³
l¤+r¤
2
´ (18)
In the Appendix we show that the second-order condition for maximum is
ful…lled under our assumption f 0=f < 4:
Similarly, party R0s …rst-order condition yields
(r¤ ¡ l¤) = 1¡ F
³
l¤+r¤
2
´
ÁR
2
f
³
l¤+r¤
2
´ (19)
Using (18) and (19) gives us
F
Ã
l¤ + r¤
2
!
=
ÁL
ÁL + ÁR
=
1
1 + ÁR
ÁL
: (20)
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using (15), we …nally get
V (l¤; r¤; l¤; r¤; ÁL; ÁR) =
ÁL
ÁL + ÁR
=
1
1 + ÁR
ÁL
(21)
The vote shares are determined by the relative fraction of voters informed
about each party’s policy. If the fractions are equal, then party L gets exactly
one half of the votes. If ÁL > ÁR; party L receives more than half of the votes.
Since more voters are informed about L0s policy than about R0s policy, L0s
vote share is more responsive to policy changes. This implies that party L
gains more votes from moderating its policy towards the middle than party
R does. Hence, in equilibrium, party L’s policy will be more moderate than
party R0s and party L will get a larger vote-share.
Equation (21) indicates the value of a good information technology. If we
suppose that the parties receive equal funding, but that party L has better
access to mass media, (perhaps for historical, personal or other reasons) it
can more easily convert money into information, so that ÁL > ÁR, and thus,
obtains a larger vote-share. Good relations with the mass media makes for
high vote-shares in our model.
Inserting equation (20) into (19), we get that policy polarization is given
by
r ¡ l = 2
(ÁL + ÁR) f
³
l+r
2
´ (22)
Let us now increase ÁL and ÁR in such a way that ÁL=ÁR is constant. From
(20), l+r
2
is una¤ected, (22) directly gives a decrease in policy polarization.
In the symmetrical case, where ÁL = ÁR; this is particularly clear. Here, (22)
reduces to
r ¡ l = 1
Áf(m)
: (23)
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Policy polarization decreases when more voters become informed. Hence,
when campaigns are informative, policies converge if the funds available for
campaigning increase.
Consider brie‡y a case in which expectations are not formed rationally
but depend on past policy proposals. Let us also assume that time is discrete
and runs from zero to in…nity. Each period is as described above. First, the
parties propose policies, then the elections are held, and …nally, the winner
implements the promised policy. Suppose that the expectations of period t
depend on the policy proposals of period t ¡ 1; so let = lt¡1 and ret = rt¡1:
Suppose, furthermore, that parties are myopic, and seek to maximize the
expected utility of one period only. In a stationary state, one has let =
lt¡1 = lt and ret = rt¡1 = rt for all t ¸ 0: The rational expectations solution
studied above corresponds, therefore, to a stationary state of the dynamic
game outlined here.
7 Public Funding
We will now introduce the public funding system into the informative cam-
paigning model. Party L0s vote share is V (l; r; le; re; ÁL; ÁR) as given by
equation (15). The derivations above took into account that parties realize
that their choice of policy will a¤ect funding and therefore ÁL and ÁR; so that
these derivations are still valid, see equation (17) and the related discussion.
As is clear, rational expectations simplify matters considerably here. Using
equation (20), we get
V (l; r; l; r; ÁL; ÁR) =
ÁL(cL)
ÁL(cL) + ÁR(1¡ cL)
; (24)
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where we have explicitly written the Á0s as functions of the funds allocated
to party L: As previously, cL = Ã(v); so
cL = Ã
Ã
ÁL(cL)
ÁL(cL) + ÁR(1¡ cL)
!
: (25)
which determines cL: Depending on the Á and Ã functions, there may be one
or more …xed points.
We now assume that the parties are equally e¢cient in informing voters,
so ÁL(c) = ÁR(c) = Á(c): In this case equation (25) becomes
cL = Ã
Ã
Á(cL)
Á(cL) + Á(1¡ cL)
!
(26)
As the public funding system is fair, Ã(1=2) = 1=2, and we see that cL = 1=2
is a solution. Hence, a symmetric equilibrium exists, in which each party
receives half of the votes.
Advertising by parties is not the only way voters receive information
about policies. Some (many) voters read newspapers, listen to radios, watch
TV etc., thus, some voters will be informed about a party’s policy even if
the party does not advertise. This means that it is reasonable to assume
that Á(0) > 0: Consequently, the vote-share for party L, as given by (24), is
positive in equilibrium. Similarly, the vote-share for party R is positive. By
assumption, a party receives funds if its vote-share is positive, so that cL = 0
or cL = 1 cannot be compatible with equilibrium.
Whether multiple equilibria exist or not depends on the right-hand side
of equation (26). Since it is positive at cL = 0 and less than one at cL = 1,
a su¢cient (but not necessary) condition for multiple equilibria is that the
slope evaluated at cL = 1=2 is larger than one. Using Ã(12) =
1
2
; this condition
can be written
1
2
Ã0
³
1
2
´
Ã(1
2
)
²
1
2
Á0(1
2
)
Á(1
2
)
> 1: (27)
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The …rst term is the elasticity of public funding with respect to a change in
vote-share. The second term is the elasticity of the fraction of informed voters
with respect to campaign funds. When both elasticities are large, multiple
equilibria exist. There will then be a symmetric equilibrium, where c = 1=2
and (at least) two asymmetric equilibria. In an asymmetric equilibrium, one
of the parties will be large and will therefore receive a larger fraction of public
funds, and by virtue of it, continue to be large. If such an equilibrium exists,
there then exists another, similar, equilibrium, where the roles are reversed.
Hence, in this case, one can conclude that public funding - coupled with
advertising technology - may be the cause of asymmetric support for the two
parties.
In the asymmetric equilibrium, the small party remains small exactly be-
cause it is small. The reason for this is the public funding system. This
phenomenon has been termed ”petri…cation” in political science. See Nass-
macher (1989, p 248).
7.1 On the Á¡function, two examples
In this section we will propose a foundation for the Á¡function, which gener-
alizes the foundation proposed by Grossman and Shapiro (1984) in their work
on informative advertising in monopolistic competition (building on Butters,
1977). We will show how existence of multiple equilibria depends on the
speci…c assumptions on the advertising technology. Imagine that parties put
ads in magazines. A magazine has a readership equal to a fraction r of the
population, so that with a probability r a given voter will see a party’s ad in
a speci…c magazine. We assume that in order to become informed about a
party’s policy a voter has to see more than s ads from the party, where s ¸ 0:
The idea is that ”repetition is reputation”!. Hence, if a party advertises in n
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magazines the fraction of agents informed about its policy is equal to,
Ás = 1¡
sX
x=0
Ã
n
x
!
rx(1¡ r)n¡x (28)
where s ¸ 0:
Suppose that the cost of an ad in a magazine is a per reader of the
magazine, so that an ad costs ar: If the party has funds c, it can therefore
obtain the fraction of informed voters
Ás(c) = 1¡
sX
x=0
Ã
c
ar
x
!
rx(1¡ r) car¡x (29)
The more expensive advertising is, the lower c
ar
is and the lower Ás(c) will also
be. Note that this advertising technology implies Ás(0) = 0 and Á
0
s(c) > 0
12
Grosmann-Shapiro and Butters assumes that an agent gets informed if
she sees at least one ad, in our framework this corresponds to the case where
s = 0: One can easily show that the elasticity of Á0 evaluated at c = 1=2 is
1
2
Á00(12)
Á0(
1
2
)
< 1
Hence, the elasticity of the Ã- function has to be greater than 1 for the su¢-
cient condition for multiple equilibria to be ful…lled: Inserting this Á0¡function
in equation (25) yields
cL = Ã
Ã
1¡ (1¡ r) car
1¡ (1¡ r) car + 1¡ (1¡ r) 1¡car
!
(30)
Let us consider the speci…c case Ã(x) = x, so that we can focus our
analysis on the role played by the advertising technology on the existence of
multiple equilibria. It is obvious that, cL = 12 is a solution to (30). Similarly,
12This derivative doesn’t need to be positive for c < ar, i.e. for values of n less than 1.
We will disregard such values.
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by insertion, it is readily seen that cL = 0 and cL = 1 also are solutions, if we
assume that a party that receives no votes, receives no funds Ã(0) = 0: These
are the only solutions in the interval [0,1]. Multiple equilibria, therefore,
exists13, but the corner equilibria depend crucially on the fact that Á0(0) = 0
and Á0(1) = 1; which may seem unreasonable as already discussed above.
If we modify our framework slightly and assume that a fraction ¯ of
the voters becomes informed about a party’s policy regardless of whether
it advertises or not, the asymmetric equilibria disappear. The remaining
fraction 1¡¯ are as described above. If a party receives funds equal to c, its
policy will be learned about by ¯ + (1¡ ¯)Á0(c) voters. We then get
cL =
¯ + (1¡ ¯)
³
1¡ (1¡ r) car
´
¯ + (1¡ ¯)
³
1¡ (1¡ r) car
´
+ ¯ + (1¡ ¯)
³
1¡ (1¡ r) 1¡car
´
Here cL = 12 is the only solution in the interval [0; 1]:
The advertising technology proposed by Grossman and Shapiro has the
feature that the marginal value of advertising is overall decreasing, Á000(c) < 0:
Suppose, instead, that voters have to see at least two adds in order to be
informed about a party’s policy, i.e. that s ¸ 1: This corresponds to the case
where a certain amount of advertising is required to “get the message across”
and yet, on the other hand, it is very hard to reach all of the voters. In this
case, it is easy show that for low values of c we can have Á00s(c) > 0: The
intuition to understand this possibility of increasing returns is simple: Let us
consider the case s = 1 (the same idea applies to the advertising technologies
with s > 1). An agents needs to see at least two ads to become informed
about the party’s policy. Therefore, the ads in the …rst magazine inform none.
The ads in a second magazine, however, inform a positive fraction of agents,
13Remember the elasticity condition was a su¢cient condition, so there is no contradic-
tion here.
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namely r2. Eventually, the e¤ect of an ad in the n magazine, for n large
enough, is similar to the one in the Grossman-Shapiro technology since most
people already saw an ad in the previous magazines. Thus, the advertising
technology shows …rst increasing returns and then decreasing returns.
The possibility of increasing returns for some values of c allows for the
existence of multiple equilibria all of them with both cL and cR positive.
When the price of an ad, a, is very low the function Á1(c) looks, in the
relevant range, very much as the Grossman-Shapiro technology Á0(c). For
high values of a, however, the two functions might behave quite di¤erently.
Thus, we have that for low values of a the only solution (beside the two
“corner” solutions) to
c =
Á1(c)
Á1(c) + Á1(1¡ c)
is c = 1=2; that is the same one we had in the case s = 0. We might have,
however, that for large values of a the slope of Á1(c)
Á1(c)+Á1(1¡c) at c = 1=2 is
greater than one. Let us modify our framework and assume that a fraction
¯ of the voters is informed regardless of whether the party advertises or
not. In this case, the “corner” equilibria, as explained above, disappear and
two new asymmetric equilibria appear. Moreover, with this function Á1(c);
one can also generate non-corner multiple equilibria without assuming the
existence of a fraction ¯ of informed agents. Thus, it can easily be checked
that there is a whole range of intermediate values of a for which the slope of
Á1(c)
Á1(c)+Á1(1¡c) at c = 1=2 is less than one, as in the Grossman-Shapiro case, and
still the system presents multiple, non-corner equilibria. Say, for example,
that r = 0:01, so that a magazine reaches 1% of the population, and the cost
of an ad is a = 0:13. In this case, one can show, by computing simulations,
that the three equilibria are cL = 1=2, cL = 0:26 and cL = 0:74, see Figure 2.
Thus, the existence of increasing returns in the advertising technology might
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lead to an equilibrium where a party obtains a much greater voter’s support
than the other party.
8 Concluding Remarks
Public funding of political parties tends to moderate partisan policies when
such funding depends on vote-share. This conclusion holds equally well
whether campaign spending is uninformative and directly a¤ects the votes of
impressionable voters or whether campaign spending contributes to inform a
policy-oriented electorate about the di¤erent policies of the parties.
In the …rst case, campaign money buys votes. If public funding depends
on a party’s vote-share, it increases a party’s incentive to moderate its policy.
A moderate policy gives more votes and, therefore, higher public funds, which
in turn, can be used to buy even more votes. The parties, however, face a
trade-o¤ in deciding whether to maintain a policy they like or to moderate
it so that it will be more likely to be implemented. With public funding the
trade-o¤ changes, making moderation a more attractive option.
If campaigning is informative the result is the same, but the channel
is di¤erent. When deciding on a policy, a party takes into account that
only a fraction of the electorate will be informed about its choice of policy.
Uninformed voters will not learn about the precise policy choice of a given
party, but rather, will rely on their expectations. Hence, the increase in
a party’s vote-share from moderating its policy depends on the fraction of
voters who will become informed about its policy. The larger this fraction is,
the more attractive a moderation of the policy will be. Since public funding
ensures that a larger fraction of the electorate is informed, it induces policy
moderation. Note that what is important here is the level of funding, while, in
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the case of impressionable voters, it is the responsiveness of public funding to
changes in vote-share that is important. This is where the mechanism di¤er
in the two cases.
We have assumed that voters are risk-neutral. While this makes for sim-
plicity, it also implies that we disregard a potentially important feature of in-
formative campaigning. Namely, that information reduces uncertainty about
a party’s policy. If voters are risk-averse, this is a positive feature of cam-
paigning (see Brock and Magee 1978, Austen-Smith 1987 and Cameron and
Enelow 1992 for theoretical models with risk-averse voters, uncertainty about
parties’ platforms and campaign spending …nanced by private contributors)
In our model, a voter who is uninformed about a party’s policy has a
point expectation about it. In equilibrium, that expectation is correct. If
the voter was uncertain about the policy, such that she had a non-degenerate
probability distribution over possible policies, and if, furthermore, she were
risk-averse, she would then tend to dislike the party, simply because of such
uncertainty. A risk-averse voter who is indi¤erent between le and re would
prefer party L if she were not completely sure about R’s policy. In such a
case, campaigning would have a positive e¤ect, from the party’s point of view.
Even though uninformed voters may have correct expectations on average,
more voters would vote for R if they were sure about its policy.
We conjecture that adding uncertainty and risk-aversion to our model
would simply reinforce our results. Parties would be more eager to raise
campaign funds, since reducing the uncertainty about their policies would
attract more votes, which, in turn, would give them a further incentive to
modify their policies towards the middle, in order to enjoy larger public funds.
As it stands, our model shows that policy convergence results even if
voters are risk-neutral and there is no uncertainty about any party’s policy.
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9 Appendix
9.1 With impressionable voters
Proof of Proposition 1.
The …rst-order conditions for the parties areÃ
®H 0(¢)
d¢
dl
+
(1¡ ®)
2
f
Ã
l + r
2
!!
(r ¡ l) (31)
¡
Ã
®H(¢) + (1¡ ®)F
Ã
l + r
2
!!
= 0
and Ã
®H 0(¢))
d¢
dr
+
(1¡ ®)
2
f
Ã
l + r
2
!!
(r ¡ l) (32)
¡
Ã
® (1¡H(¢)) + (1¡ ®)
Ã
1¡ F
Ã
l + r
2
!!!
= 0
Now
d¢
dl
= ¢0(v(l; r))
@v(l; r)
@l
(33)
By inserting (5) and (33), and simplifying, we can rewrite the …rst-order
condition for maximum for party L; (31)
1
(1¡ ®H 0(¢)¢0(v))
f
³
l+r
2
´
2
(r ¡ l)¡
Ã
®
1¡ ®H(¢) + F
Ã
l + r
2
!!
= 0:
(34)
Similarly, the …rst-order condition for R; (32) can be written as
1
1¡ ®H 0(¢)¢0(v)
f
³
l+r
2
´
2
(r ¡ l)¡
Ã
®
1¡ ® (1¡H(¢)) +
Ã
1¡ F
Ã
l + r
2
!!!
= 0
(35)
Thus, since the …rst parts of (34) and (35) are identical,
®
1¡ ®H(¢) + F
Ã
l + r
2
!
=
®
1¡ ® (1¡H(¢)) +
Ã
1¡ F
Ã
l + r
2
!!
;
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which implies that
v = ®H(¢) + (1¡ ®)F
Ã
l + r
2
!
=
1
2
: (36)
Each party gets half of the votes. Since, ¢(1
2
) = 0; and H(0) = 1
2
; this
implies F
³
l¤+r¤
2
´
= 1
2
so that
l¤ + r¤
2
= m (37)
Inserting into (34) and rearranging yields
(r¤ ¡ l¤) = 1¡ ®H
0(0) ¢0(1
2
)
1¡ ®
1
f(m)
(38)
Using l
¤+r¤
2
= m; we …nally get
l¤ = m¡ 1
2
1¡ ®H 0(0) ¢0(1
2
)
1¡ ®
1
f(m)
: (39)
and
r¤ = m+
1
2
1¡ ®H 0(0) ¢0(1
2
)
1¡ ®
1
f(m)
: (40)
thus, the policies are symmetrical around m:
Derivation of the second-order condition.
We derive the su¢cient conditions for the second-order condition for max-
imum in the model with impressionable voters. For party L the second-order
condition for maximum is
¡2
Ã
®H0d¢
dl
+
1¡ ®
2
f
!
+
Ã
®H00d¢
dl
+ ®H0d
2¢
dl2
+
1¡ ®
4
f 0
!
(r ¡ l) · 0
(41)
Since r¡ l · 1; this is ful…lled if
¡2
Ã
®H0d¢
dl
+
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2
f
!
+ ®H00d¢
dl
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dl2
+
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4
f 0 · 0
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or
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®
Ã
f 0
4
¡ f
!
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dl2
+
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dl
(H00 ¡ 2H0) · 0
assuming that d¢
dl
> 0; (which is the case if Ã0 > 0), we can rewrite it as
(1¡ ®)
®
Ã
f 0
4
¡ f
!
+H0d¢
dl
0@ d2¢dl2
d¢
dl
+
H00
H0 ¡ 2
1A · 0
We can see that a su¢cient condition for this to be ful…lled is that
f 0
f
< 4; and
d2¢
dl2
,
d¢
dl
+
H00
H0 < 2: (42)
The latter condition is a joint condition on the responsiveness of the govern-
ment funding system and the responsiveness of the impressionable voters. It
is di¢cult to de…ne general conditions that would ensure that this is ful…lled.
If, however, H00 = 0 and Ã00 = 0; so that ¢00 = 0; the condition is ful…lled.
To verify this, we can calculate
d¢
dl
= ¢0(v(l; r))@v(l; r)
@l
and
d2¢
dl2
= ¢00@v(l; r)
@l
+¢0 @
2v
@l2
Hence
d2¢
dl2
,
d¢
dl
=
¢00@v(l;r)
@l
+¢0 @2v
@l2
¢0@v(l;r)
@l
=
¢00
¢0 +
@2v
@l2
,
@v(l; r)
@l
Using (5) we get
@2v
@l
=
1¡®
4
f 0 (1¡ ®H0¢0) + 1¡®
2
®f¢00H0@v
@l
+ (¢0)2H00@v
@l
(1¡ ® H0 ¢0)2
=
1¡®
4
f 0
(1¡ ® H0 ¢0) <
(1¡ ®) f
1¡ ® H0 ¢0 = 2
@v
@l
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where the …rst equality follows from the assumption thatH00 = 0 and Ã00 = 0;
so that ¢00 = 0: The inequality follows from the assumption that f 0=f < 4:
We now have that
@2v
@l2
,
@v(l; r)
@l
< 2
together with ¢00 = 0; this gives that d2¢
dl2
.
d¢
dl
< 2: Under the assumption
that H00 = 0; this implies that the second inequality in (42) is ful…lled as
claimed. As is clear from this deviation, it is not necessary that H00 = 0 and
¢00 = 0. They should simply not be too large. Party R is in a symmetric
situation, its second-order condition being ful…lled under the same assump-
tions. Finally, we should note that if d¢
dl
= 0; the second-order condition is
ful…lled if f 0=f < 4:
9.2 With informative campaigning
We shall now show that the second-order condition is also ful…lled in the
model with informative campaigning.
Equation (12) implies
@2V
@ÁL@l
=
ÁR
2
f
Ã
l + r
2
!
¡ ÁR
2
f
Ã
l + re
2
!
= 0 (43)
when r = re: Similarly, and using rational expectations again, (12) also
implies
@2V
@ÁR@l
= 0 (44)
Party L0s …rst-order condition isÃ
@V
@l
+
@V
@ÁL
@ÁL
@l
+
@V
@ÁR
@ÁR
@l
!
(r¤ ¡ l¤)¡ V = 0
Hence, its second-order condition for maximum is0@@2V
@l2
+
d
³
@V
@ÁL
@ÁL
@l
+ @V
@ÁR
@ÁR
@l
´
dl
1A (r¤ ¡ l¤)¡Ã2@V
@l
+
@V
@ÁL
@ÁL
@l
+
@V
@ÁR
@ÁR
@l
!
· 0
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Using (14), (43) and (44) it reduces to
@2V
@l2
(r¤ ¡ l¤)¡ 2@V
@l
· 0
Inserting (13) yields
ÁL
4
f 0
Ã
l + r
2
!
(r ¡ l)¡ 2ÁL
2
f
Ã
l + r
2
!
· 0
which is clearly ful…lled under our assumption f 0=f < 4:
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